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Chemical
A United Nations report from 1969
defines chemical warfare agents as chemical substances, whether
gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be employed because of their direct
toxic effects on man, animals and plants
Thousands of U.S. gulf-war veterans complain about fatigue, memory loss and aching joints. They call it gulf war
syndrome
3rd
Chemical Brigade
MISSIONTrain
disciplined, confident, motivated, fit, values based, technically and tactically
proficient, combat-ready soldiers and leaders for world-wide assignment capable
of immediately contributing positively to their unit. Provide command,
control, administration, training, and logistics for the 82nd
Chemical Battalion, the 84th Chemical Battalion, the 58th
Transportation Battalion, the Chemical Defense Training Facility.
PROTEGAMUS!
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Dirty
Weapons
“Dirty” nuclear or radiological weapons are
bombs that use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material
with the intent of causing lethal or debilitating radiation sickness.
They are designed to kill or injure through radiation only, as opposed
to blast or shock.
Dirty radiological weapons may be produced by
encasing highly radioactive material in lead, and surrounding the device
with conventional high explosives. The resulting explosion would
disperse the radiation over a potentially wide area, depending on
atmospheric and weather conditions. The potential health problems
resulting from intense radiation are well established by the nuclear
disaster at Chernobyl in 1986 and a second event in Goiania, Brazil in
1987
At the Chernobyl site, an accident in a nuclear
reactor resulted in a series of explosions that totally destroyed one
reactor and widely dispersed radioactive material that contaminated
large parts of northern Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. For the purposes
of this report, the volume of nuclear material dispersed into the
atmosphere is unknown. Thirty-one persons were killed and 140 developed
significant illness, but none of these were amongst the general
population, that is, they were plant personnel and rescue workers. The
accident occurred in a relatively sparsely populated area of northern
Ukraine. Large numbers of persons were evacuated from a 30-kilometer
radius of the plant, and large amounts of land were declared off limits
to farming. In the 15 years since the accident, there has been a
significant increase in thyroid cancers, mostly in children, but no
increases in the numbers of other cancers. Psychological disorders were
a more common side effect of the disaster.
In the Brazilian case, scrap scavengers broke into a
radiological clinic and stole a capsule containing about an ounce of
highly radioactive cesium 137. The thieves broke up the cesium and
passed the pieces to friends and relatives. Of the 249 persons
contaminated, four died, 14 persons were “overexposed,” and 110,000
persons were subjected to continuous monitoring. In addition, 85 houses,
and truckloads of personal possessions had to be destroyed. Large
amounts of contaminated earth were also removed.
In April 2001, Uzbek customs officers intercepted and
seized a truck carrying 10 lead-lined boxes filled with highly
irradiated (with strontium-90) scrap metal. The shipment was destined
for Quetta, Pakistan, near the Afghan border. Its origin is unknown,
except somewhere in the Former Soviet Union.
According to published reports, a crude radiological
weapon could be constructed with only “a few” kilograms of plutonium
or highly enriched uranium. A small amount of plutonium dispersed by
conventional explosives could cause fatalities over hundreds of meters
from the detonation site.Several countries have nuclear weapons, and
more have nuclear power plants. Theft of nuclear weapons is a remote
possibility. Spent nuclear fuel could possibly be utilized in such a
weapon, although the radiological yields would be relatively small
compared to enriched uranium or plutonium. The Iraqis reportedly
exploded three radiological weapons in the mid-1980’s using spent fuel
from a nuclear plant packed inside conventional weapons. However, the
Iraqis reportedly dropped development of their program because of the
“disappointing” results, apparently due to the ineffectual dispersal
of the radioactive material.
An airborne attack on a nuclear plant would probably
produce greater deleterious effects. Nuclear power plants, although they
are designed to withstand earthquakes, are not designed to withstand a
fuel-laden aircraft crash. Nuclear power plants in the US are located
outside high-density population areas, but “favorable”
meteorological conditions could heighten the amount of radiation
dispersed by such an attack. However, coordinating an aircraft hijacking
with “favorable” weather conditions would be highly problematical.
Plutonium, according to open source reporting, could be delivered in
aerosol form, possibly by aerial spraying from an aircraft or UAV (NFI).
This form of delivery would be even more subject to the vagaries of
meteorological conditions.
Although UBL and associated groups are theoretically
capable of organizing a dirty bomb attack, heightened awareness of a
terrorist nuclear threat and the protective measures that have been
instituted to protect nuclear assets following 11 September, dispersal
of terrorist personnel, coupled with transportation difficulties, would
make the delivery of a dirty nuclear device far more difficult now than
prior to September 11. However, even though the expected casualty rate
achieved by such a radiological attack is questionable, and more
conventional attacks and psychological terror produced by real or
imagined biological or chemical agents may be more productive, the
results of a radiological attack of some kind would be a severe
psychological blow to civilian morale.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
there have been 370 reported instances of nuclear smuggling since 1993.
Most of these incidents likely occurred in the years following the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when there are numerous accounts
of terrorists and gangsters stealing and selling nuclear materials. In
1995, Chechen guerillas were able to obtain 15 kgs of cesium, apparently
from a cancer treatment facility in the former Soviet Union, burying it
near the entrance of a tourist attraction in Moscow. Although the
container emitted massive amounts of radiation, up to 200,000 times
normal levels, no casualties were reported from the exposure. Generally
though, most reporting on the theft of nuclear materials in the former
Soviet Union involves former Soviet Union criminal elements obtaining
small amounts of spent nuclear fuel for criminal activities, including a
gang-related murder. But many of the reported caught smugglers were
ignorant of both the usage and consequences of stealing nuclear
materials. More recent open source, unconfirmed reporting has raised the
possibility that Chechen Muslims or the Russian Mafia obtained or sought
nuclear materials for delivery to UBL groups in exchange for $30 million
and two tons of narcotics.
Radioactive waste or material would have to be
encased in lead or concrete and steel or the transport personnel
themselves would be subject to lethal doses of radiation. Legitimate
nuclear waste is transported in specially designed casks that could be
blown open by shape charges, such as from an anti-tank weapon. Such an
attack, however, would depend on terrorists’ foreknowledge of shipping
means and times.
Obtaining, storing, and transporting nuclear
materials are possibly the most difficult aspects of delivering an
improvised radiological weapon. Nuclear materials in the US are well
protected, forcing terrorists to obtain the radioactive materials
abroad. International transportation and storage of these materials, not
to mention placement and detonation, would require substantial resources
in personnel, logistical support, and funding. The World Trade Center
and Pentagon attacks reportedly required about $500,000 and years of
planning and coordination, and produced about 4000 fatalities. The
result of an aircraft crashing into a skyscraper or building crowded
with workers is relatively easy to gauge. A radiological weapon, based
on past results, is less dependable as a casualty-producing weapon, and
carries with it the problems of transporting the material (probably
across international borders), and obtaining enough and the right kind
of explosives to detonate it. The Iraqi example shows the difficulties
of producing an effective radiological weapon even with adequate
resources.
At left is a map of the radiation contamination zone
resulting from the Chernobyl disaster. As the winds blew north,
radiation was swept into Belarus, Russia, Scandinavia, and beyond.
Habitants are still excluded from the 30-km zone immediately surrounding
the site, and farming is officially prohibited in parts of the
radiation-affected fallout area 15 years after the disaster.
The purpose of terror weapons is not only to inflict
casualties, but also to destroy morale, injure economic conditions, and
create panic and fear amongst the citizenry. These goals might be
accomplished by the detonation of some type of dirty nuclear device,
however ineffective it would be as a producer of mass casualties.
Abandonment of valuable real assets because of radiation contamination,
and the resulting adverse economic and psychological effects on the
population would probably be the most severe consequences of a dirty
bomb attack.
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