Korean War
Page 5

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Characteristics

Armored warfare
In the initial invasion stage of the war, North Korean armor was able to establish dominance using their Soviet-supplied T-34-85 medium tanks. The WW2-vintage North Korean tanks were facing a South Korean force with no tanks of their own and few modern anti-tank weapons. Most South Korean soldiers were unfamiliar with tanks or how to counter them.

The South Korean army had anti-tank rockets but these were World War II vintage 2.36 inch (60 mm) M9 bazookas. The bazooka rocket could easily penetrate the 45mm side armor armor of the T-34-85s at any range, but the bazooka was nonetheless found to be ineffective. Until the U.S. introduced the heavier 3.5 inch (89 mm) M20 bazooka, South Korean troops were unable to effectively counter North Korean tanks.

As U.S. forces arrived in Korea, they were accompanied only by light M24 Chaffee tanks which had been left in Japan for post-WWII occupation duties (heavier tanks would have torn up Japanese roads). These light tanks were ineffective against the larger North Korean T-34-85 tanks. U.S. 105 mm howitzers were used on at least one occasion to fire HEAT ammunition over open sights.

As the U.S. buildup continued, shipments of heavier American tanks such as the M4 Sherman, the M26 Pershing, the M46 Patton, and the British Centurion as well as American and Allied ground attack aircraft were able to reverse the Communists' tank advantage. All of the UN medium tanks were able to defeat the T-34-85.

However, in contrast to World War II's heavy emphasis on armor, few open tank battles actually occurred over the course of the Korean War. The country's heavily forested and mountainous terrain, as well as the poor road network, meant that tanks were able to operate only in small groups.

Air warfare
The Korean War was the last major war where propeller-powered fighters such as the F-51 Mustang, F4U Corsair and aircraft carrier-based Hawker Sea Fury and Supermarine Seafire were used. Turbojet fighter aircraft such as F-80s and F9F Panthers came to dominate the skies, overwhelming North Korea’s propeller-driven Yakovlev Yak-9s and Lavochkin La-9s.

From 1950, North Koreans began flying the Soviet-made MiG-15 jet fighters, some of which were piloted by experienced Soviet Air Force pilots, a casus belli deliberately overlooked by the UN allied forces who were reluctant to engage in open war with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. At first, UN jet fighters, which also included Royal Australian Air Force Gloster Meteors, had some success, but the superior quality of the MiGs soon held sway over the first-generation jets used by the UN early in the war.

In December 1950, the U.S. Air Force began using the F-86 Sabre. The Mig could fly higher, 50,000 vs. 42,000　feet (12,800　m), offering a distinct advantage at the start of combat. In level flight, their maximum speeds were comparable　— about 660　mph (1,060　km/h). The Mig could climb better, while the Sabre could turn and dive better. For weapons, the Mig carried two 23 mm and one 37 mm cannon, compared to the Sabre’s six .50 (12.7 mm) caliber machine guns. The American .50 caliber machine guns, while not packing the same punch, carried many more rounds and were aimed with a superior radar-ranging gunsight. The U.S. pilots also had the advantage of G-suits, which were used for the first time in this war. However, maintenance was an issue with the Sabre, and a large proportion of the UN air strength was grounded because of repairs during the war.

Even after the United States Air Force introduced the advanced F-86, its pilots often struggled against the jets piloted by elite Soviet pilots. The UN gradually gained a large numerical advantage, and this with their aggressiveness (along with limits on the Soviet involvement) gave them an air superiority　 over most of Korea that lasted until the end of the war　— a decisive factor in helping the UN first advance into the north, and then resist the Chinese invasion of South Korea. The Chinese and North Koreans also had jet power, but their training and experience were limited. With the introduction of the F-86F in late 1952, the Soviet and American aircraft had virtually identical performance characteristics.

After the war, the USAF claimed 792 MiG-15s and 108 additional aircraft shot down by Sabres for the loss of 78 Sabres, a ratio in excess of 10:1. Some post-war research has been able to confirm only 379 victories, although the USAF continues to maintain its official credits and the debate is possibly irreconcilable. Recently exposed Stalin-era Soviet documentation shows that only 345 Soviet MiG-15s were lost to all causes during the Korean War.

The Soviets claimed about 1,100 air-to-air victories and 335 combat MiG losses at that time. China’s official losses were 231 planes shot down in air-to-air combat (mostly MiG-15) and 168 other losses. The number of losses of the North Korean Air Force was not revealed. It is estimated that it lost about 200 aircraft in the first stage of the war, and another 70 aircraft after Chinese intervention. Soviet claims of 650 victories over the Sabres, and China’s claims of another 211 F-86s, are considered to be exaggerated by the USAF. According to a recent U.S. publication, the number of F-86s ever present in the Korean peninsula during the war totaled only 674 and the total F-86 losses from all causes were about 230.

Direct comparison of Sabre and Mig  losses seem irrelevant, since primary targets for Migs were heavy B-29 bombers and ground-attack aircraft, while the primary targets for Sabres were MiG-15s.

By early 1951, the battle lines hardened and did not change much for the rest of the conflict. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1951, the outnumbered Sabres (as few as 44 at one point) of the 4th FIW continued to seek battle in Mig Alley near the Yalu against an enemy fielding as many as 500 planes, although only a fraction of these were operational and active. Following Colonel Harrison Thyng’s famous message to the Pentagon, the 51st FIW reinforced the beleaguered 4th in December 1951.　 For the next year and a half, the combat continued in generally the same fashion.

Proposed use of nuclear weapons
Historian Bruce Cumings believes that Truman's allusions to the possibility of nuclear weapons use at a press conference on November 30, 1950 "was a threat based on contingency planning to use the bomb, rather than the faux pas so many assumed it to be."　　 Cumings argues that Truman sought MacArthur's removal primarily because he felt that MacArthur would not be reliable enough in a situation where Washington had decided to use atomic weapons. Cumings notes that the same day as the press conference, orders were sent between top Air Forces generals for the Strategic Air Command to "augment its capacities and that this should include "atomic capabilities."　　 According to Cumings, the U.S. reached its closest point of using nuclear weapons during the war in April 1951. At the end of March, after the Chinese had moved large amounts of new forces near the Korean border, U.S. bomb loading pits at Kadena air base in Okinawa were made operational, and bombs were assembled there "lacking only the essential nuclear cores." On April 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff released orders for immediate retaliatory attacks using atomic weapons against Manchurian bases in the event that large numbers of new Chinese troops entered into the fights or bombing attacks originated from those bases. The same day Truman gave his approval for transfer of nine Mark IV nuclear capsules "to the air force's Ninth Bomb Group, the designated carrier of the weapons" and "the president signed an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets." Remarking that the signed order was never sent, Cuming's offers two reasons why this was the case. Firstly, Truman had used the crisis to convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the necessity of MacArthur's removal (announced April 10) and secondly, since the war was not thereafter escalated by the Chinese and Soviets, no necessity of using them presented itself.

This viewpoint is contradicted however by the facts, as on November 30, 1950, President Truman at a press conference, remarked, no doubt extemporaneously, that the use of the atomic bomb was under active consideration, unintentionally implying to some observers that its use would be left to the discretion of General MacArthur. Even though subsequently he attempted to subdue the storm of protest and consternation which followed by pointing out that only he could authorize use of the atomic bomb and that he had not given such authorization, he could not avoid the real issue that any decision to use the bomb would be a United States, not a United Nations, decision. This led to a meeting December 4 with Clement Attlee, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (who also represented the leaders of the other Commonwealth nations and with the French Premier and Foreign Minister, to discuss their concerns over the possible use of the atomic bomb. Indian Ambassador Pannikkar recalls, "that Truman announced that he was thinking of using the atom bomb in Korea. But the Chinese seemed totally unmoved by this threat.... The propaganda against American aggression was stepped up. The 'Aid Korea to resist America' campaign was made the slogan for increased production, greater national integration, and more rigid control over anti-national activities. One could not help feeling that Truman's threat came in very useful to the leaders of the revolution to enable them to keep up the tempo of their activities."

Six days later, on December 6, 1950, after the Chinese intervention had forced the UN forces into a retreat from northern North Korea, General J. Lawton Collins (Army Chief of Staff), General MacArthur, Admiral C. Turner Joy, and General Stratemeyer, and with key staff officers, Hickey, Willoughby, and Wright, met in Tokyo for a full discussion of what moves to take against the Chinese. They projected three hypothetical scenarios covering the next few weeks or months.

In the first, they theorized that if the Chinese continued their all-out attack but with the UN Command forbidden to mount air attacks against China, no blockade of China set up, no reinforcements sent to Korea by Chiang Kai-shek, and that there would be no substantial increase in MacArthur's U.S. forces until April 1951 when four National Guard divisions might be sent, then the atomic bomb might be used in North Korea.

Under the second scenario, the conferees assumed a situation in which the Chinese attack would continue but with an effective naval blockade of China put in effect, air reconnaissance and bombing of the Chinese mainland allowed, Chinese Nationalist forces exploited to the maximum, and the atomic bomb to be used if tactically appropriate. Given these conditions, General MacArthur said he should be directed to hold positions in Korea as far north as possible.

Under the third scenario, in which the Chinese would agree not to cross south of the 38th Parallel, MacArthur felt the United Nations should accept an armistice. The conditions of the armistice should preclude movement of North Korean and Chinese forces below the parallel. North Korean guerrillas should withdraw into their own territory with the Eighth Army remaining in positions covering the Seoul-Inch'on area, while X Corps pulled back to Pusan. An United Nations commission should supervise the implementation of armistice terms.

So, while the U.S. had contemplated using the atomic bomb in Korea, Truman did not publicly threaten to use the bomb immediately after the Chinese intervention, but instead remarked about the consideration of using the bomb around 45 days later and only after UN forces were in retreat and had suffered some serious losses. MacArthur and other military leaders did not work on scenarios for using the bomb until after Truman's inadvertent remark during a press conference 6 days earlier. The decision not to use the atomic bomb also was not due to "a disinclination by the USSR and PRC to escalate" but rather due to pressure from UN allies, notably Britain, the British Commonwealth, and France, who were concerned that if the United States became involved in a war with Communist China, American commitments to NATO would, through sheer necessity, go by the board. China then might have little difficulty in persuading Russia to move into western Europe and without U.S. resistance to this aggression, Russia could take all of Europe at little cost.   next